--- /dev/null
+# Block access to some directories that are allowed per default
+<Directory /var/www/>
+ Require all denied
+</Directory>
+
+# Changing the following options will not really affect the security of the
+# server, but might make attacks slightly more difficult in some cases.
+
+#
+# ServerTokens
+# This directive configures what you return as the Server HTTP response
+# Header. The default is 'Full' which sends information about the OS-Type
+# and compiled in modules.
+# Set to one of: Full | OS | Minimal | Minor | Major | Prod
+# where Full conveys the most information, and Prod the least.
+#ServerTokens Minimal
+ServerTokens Minor
+#ServerTokens Full
+
+#
+# Optionally add a line containing the server version and virtual host
+# name to server-generated pages (internal error documents, FTP directory
+# listings, mod_status and mod_info output etc., but not CGI generated
+# documents or custom error documents).
+# Set to "EMail" to also include a mailto: link to the ServerAdmin.
+# Set to one of: On | Off | EMail
+ServerSignature Off
+#ServerSignature On
+
+#
+# Allow TRACE method
+#
+# Set to "extended" to also reflect the request body (only for testing and
+# diagnostic purposes).
+#
+# Set to one of: On | Off | extended
+TraceEnable Off
+#TraceEnable On
+
+#
+# Forbid access to version control directories
+#
+# If you use version control systems in your document root, you should
+# probably deny access to their directories. For example, for subversion:
+#
+#<DirectoryMatch "/\.svn">
+# Require all denied
+#</DirectoryMatch>
+
+#
+# Setting this header will prevent MSIE from interpreting files as something
+# else than declared by the content type in the HTTP headers.
+# Requires mod_headers to be enabled.
+#
+Header set X-Content-Type-Options: "nosniff"
+
+#
+# Setting this header will prevent other sites from embedding pages from this
+# site as frames. This defends against clickjacking attacks.
+# Requires mod_headers to be enabled.
+#
+Header set X-Frame-Options: "sameorigin"
+
+
+# vim: syntax=apache ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 sr noet
--- /dev/null
+# SSL OCSP stapling
+#SSLStaplingCache shmcb:/var/cache/apache2/ssl_stapling_cache(256000)
+#SSLUseStapling on
+
+# Redirects
+<Macro HTTP2HTTPS $domain>
+ <VirtualHost *:80>
+ ServerName $domain
+ Redirect permanent / https://$domain/
+ </VirtualHost>
+</Macro>
+
+
+# SSL Macros
+<Macro SSL $cert>
+ # Use HTTP Strict Transport Security to force client to use secure connections only
+ Header unset Strict-Transport-Security
+ Header set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=864000"
+ # Make sure we load everything via HTTPS
+ Header set Content-Security-Policy "upgrade-insecure-requests"
+
+ #########################################################
+ # SSL configuration below ###############################
+ #########################################################
+ # SSL Engine Switch:
+ # Enable/Disable SSL for this virtual host.
+ SSLEngine on
+
+ # configure SSL ciphers and protocols
+ SSLProtocol All -SSLv2 -SSLv3
+ # TODO: Once OpenSSL supports GCM with more than just AES, revisit this
+ # NOTE: The reason we support non-FS ciphers is stupid middleboxes like the one used by Frauenhofer in SB, that don't support FS
+ SSLCipherSuite 'kEECDH+AESGCM:kEDH+AESGCM:kEECDH:kEDH:AESGCM:ALL:!3DES:!EXPORT:!LOW:!MEDIUM:!aNULL:!eNULL'
+ SSLHonorCipherOrder on
+
+ # Certificate, DH parameters and key
+ SSLCertificateFile /etc/ssl/mycerts/$cert.crt+dh
+ SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/ssl/private/$cert.key
+
+ # Server Certificate Chain:
+ # Point SSLCertificateChainFile at a file containing the
+ # concatenation of PEM encoded CA certificates which form the
+ # certificate chain for the server certificate. Alternatively
+ # the referenced file can be the same as SSLCertificateFile
+ # when the CA certificates are directly appended to the server
+ # certificate for convinience.
+ SSLCertificateChainFile /etc/ssl/mycerts/$cert.chain
+
+ # Certificate Authority (CA):
+ # Set the CA certificate verification path where to find CA
+ # certificates for client authentication or alternatively one
+ # huge file containing all of them (file must be PEM encoded)
+ # Note: Inside SSLCACertificatePath you need hash symlinks
+ # to point to the certificate files. Use the provided
+ # Makefile to update the hash symlinks after changes.
+ #SSLCACertificatePath /etc/ssl/certs/
+ #SSLCACertificateFile /etc/apache2/ssl.crt/ca-bundle.crt
+
+ # Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL):
+ # Set the CA revocation path where to find CA CRLs for client
+ # authentication or alternatively one huge file containing all
+ # of them (file must be PEM encoded)
+ # Note: Inside SSLCARevocationPath you need hash symlinks
+ # to point to the certificate files. Use the provided
+ # Makefile to update the hash symlinks after changes.
+ #SSLCARevocationPath /etc/apache2/ssl.crl/
+ #SSLCARevocationFile /etc/apache2/ssl.crl/ca-bundle.crl
+
+ # Client Authentication (Type):
+ # Client certificate verification type and depth. Types are
+ # none, optional, require and optional_no_ca. Depth is a
+ # number which specifies how deeply to verify the certificate
+ # issuer chain before deciding the certificate is not valid.
+ #SSLVerifyClient require
+ #SSLVerifyDepth 10
+
+ # Access Control:
+ # With SSLRequire you can do per-directory access control based
+ # on arbitrary complex boolean expressions containing server
+ # variable checks and other lookup directives. The syntax is a
+ # mixture between C and Perl. See the mod_ssl documentation
+ # for more details.
+ #<Location />
+ #SSLRequire ( %{SSL_CIPHER} !~ m/^(EXP|NULL)/ \
+ # and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_O} eq "Snake Oil, Ltd." \
+ # and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_OU} in {"Staff", "CA", "Dev"} \
+ # and %{TIME_WDAY} >= 1 and %{TIME_WDAY} <= 5 \
+ # and %{TIME_HOUR} >= 8 and %{TIME_HOUR} <= 20 ) \
+ # or %{REMOTE_ADDR} =~ m/^192\.76\.162\.[0-9]+$/
+ #</Location>
+
+ # SSL Engine Options:
+ # Set various options for the SSL engine.
+ # o FakeBasicAuth:
+ # Translate the client X.509 into a Basic Authorisation. This means that
+ # the standard Auth/DBMAuth methods can be used for access control. The
+ # user name is the `one line' version of the client's X.509 certificate.
+ # Note that no password is obtained from the user. Every entry in the user
+ # file needs this password: `xxj31ZMTZzkVA'.
+ # o ExportCertData:
+ # This exports two additional environment variables: SSL_CLIENT_CERT and
+ # SSL_SERVER_CERT. These contain the PEM-encoded certificates of the
+ # server (always existing) and the client (only existing when client
+ # authentication is used). This can be used to import the certificates
+ # into CGI scripts.
+ # o StdEnvVars:
+ # This exports the standard SSL/TLS related `SSL_*' environment variables.
+ # Per default this exportation is switched off for performance reasons,
+ # because the extraction step is an expensive operation and is usually
+ # useless for serving static content. So one usually enables the
+ # exportation for CGI and SSI requests only.
+ # o StrictRequire:
+ # This denies access when "SSLRequireSSL" or "SSLRequire" applied even
+ # under a "Satisfy any" situation, i.e. when it applies access is denied
+ # and no other module can change it.
+ # o OptRenegotiate:
+ # This enables optimized SSL connection renegotiation handling when SSL
+ # directives are used in per-directory context.
+ #SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth +ExportCertData +StrictRequire
+ #<FilesMatch "\.(cgi|shtml|phtml|php)$">
+ # SSLOptions +StdEnvVars
+ #</FilesMatch>
+ #<Directory /usr/lib/cgi-bin>
+ # SSLOptions +StdEnvVars
+ #</Directory>
+
+ # SSL Protocol Adjustments:
+ # The safe and default but still SSL/TLS standard compliant shutdown
+ # approach is that mod_ssl sends the close notify alert but doesn't wait for
+ # the close notify alert from client. When you need a different shutdown
+ # approach you can use one of the following variables:
+ # o ssl-unclean-shutdown:
+ # This forces an unclean shutdown when the connection is closed, i.e. no
+ # SSL close notify alert is send or allowed to received. This violates
+ # the SSL/TLS standard but is needed for some brain-dead browsers. Use
+ # this when you receive I/O errors because of the standard approach where
+ # mod_ssl sends the close notify alert.
+ # o ssl-accurate-shutdown:
+ # This forces an accurate shutdown when the connection is closed, i.e. a
+ # SSL close notify alert is send and mod_ssl waits for the close notify
+ # alert of the client. This is 100% SSL/TLS standard compliant, but in
+ # practice often causes hanging connections with brain-dead browsers. Use
+ # this only for browsers where you know that their SSL implementation
+ # works correctly.
+ # Notice: Most problems of broken clients are also related to the HTTP
+ # keep-alive facility, so you usually additionally want to disable
+ # keep-alive for those clients, too. Use variable "nokeepalive" for this.
+ # Similarly, one has to force some clients to use HTTP/1.0 to workaround
+ # their broken HTTP/1.1 implementation. Use variables "downgrade-1.0" and
+ # "force-response-1.0" for this.
+ #BrowserMatch "MSIE [2-6]" \
+ # nokeepalive ssl-unclean-shutdown \
+ # downgrade-1.0 force-response-1.0
+ # MSIE 7 and newer should be able to use keepalive
+ #BrowserMatch "MSIE [17-9]" ssl-unclean-shutdown
+</Macro>
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