don't change hostname, it doesn't work well for GUI apps under Gnome

[bubblebox.git] / profiles.py

diff --git a/profiles.py b/profiles.py
index fdb2f67ebd97c1fad0cdf5f0c5816dbd03574924..d2d78413ee8ef36d2e1dcb4b496ba145577cd2c4 100644 (file)
--- a/profiles.py
+++ b/profiles.py
@@ -1,11 +1,21 @@
 from bubblebox import *
 
 # Various default sandbox settings
-DEFAULT = collect_flags(
-  # general flags
-  bwrap_flags("--die-with-parent"),
+DEFAULT = group(
   # namespace unsharing
-  bwrap_flags("--unshare-all", "--share-net", "--hostname", "bwrapped"),
+  # cannot unshare IPC as that breaks some wine applications
+  bwrap_flags("--unshare-user", "--unshare-pid", "--unshare-cgroup"),
+  # A different hostname is useful to be able to see when we are inside the sandbox.
+  # However, some applications will not like this unless the hostname also exists in `/etc/hosts`!
+  # Also, gnome-shell doesn't display window icons properly when this is set.
+  #bwrap_flags("--unshare-uts", "--hostname", "bubblebox"),
+  # Make sure the sandbox cannot inject commands into the host terminal.
+  # TODO: This flag breaks some CLI applications, like job control in shells.
+  # Consider using SECCOMP instead.
+  # Possible code to use for that: <https://gist.github.com/sloonz/4b7f5f575a96b6fe338534dbc2480a5d#file-sandbox-py-L129>
+  # There is also a good list of possible-syscalls-to-block at
+  # <https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/blob/f16e064fd9454fb8f754b769ad1ffce0e42b51db/common/flatpak-run.c#L1791>.
+  bwrap_flags("--new-session"),
   # basic directories
   bwrap_flags("--proc", "/proc", "--dev", "/dev", "--dir", "/tmp", "--dir", "/var", "--dir", "/run", "--symlink", "../run", "/var/run"),
   # an empty XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
@@ -13,23 +23,56 @@ DEFAULT = collect_flags(
   # merged-usr symlinks
   bwrap_flags("--symlink", "usr/lib", "/lib", "--symlink", "usr/lib64", "/lib64", "--symlink", "usr/bin", "/bin", "--symlink", "usr/sbin", "/sbin"),
   # folders we always need access to
-  ro_host_access("/usr", "/sys", "/etc"),
+  host_access({ ("/usr", "/sys", "/etc"): Access.Read }),
   # make a basic shell work
-  ro_host_access(*globexpand(HOME, [".bashrc", ".bash_aliases", ".profile", "bin"])),
+  home_access({
+    (".bashrc", ".bash_aliases", ".profile"): Access.Read,
+    "bin": Access.Read,
+  }),
 )
 
-# https://github.com/igo95862/bubblejail is a good source of paths that need allowing.
+def X11():
+  display = os.environ["DISPLAY"].removeprefix(":").split('.')[0]
+  return host_access({
+      "/tmp/.X11-unix/": {
+        "X"+display: Access.Read,
+      },
+      os.environ["XAUTHORITY"]: Access.Read,
+  })
+
+# https://github.com/igo95862/bubblejail/blob/master/src/bubblejail/services.py is a good source of paths that need allowing.
 # We do not give access to pipewire, that needs a portal (https://docs.pipewire.org/page_portal.html).
-DESKTOP = collect_flags(
-  # Access to screen and audio
-  dev_host_access("/dev/dri", "/dev/snd"),
-  ro_host_access("/tmp/.X11-unix/", os.environ["XAUTHORITY"]),
-  ro_host_access(*globexpand(XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, ["wayland*", "pulse"])),
-  # Access to some key global configuration
-  ro_host_access(*globexpand(HOME, [".config/fontconfig", ".XCompose"])),
-  # Access to basic d-bus services (that are hopefully safe to expose...)
-  dbus_proxy_flags("--talk=org.kde.StatusNotifierWatcher.*", "--talk=org.freedesktop.Notifications.*", "--talk=org.freedesktop.ScreenSaver.*", "--talk=org.freedesktop.portal.*"),
-  # Make it possible to open websites in Firefox
-  ro_host_access(*globexpand(HOME, [".mozilla/firefox/profiles.ini", ".local/share/applications"])),
-  dbus_proxy_flags("--talk=org.mozilla.firefox.*"),
-)
+def DESKTOP(name):
+  return group(
+    DEFAULT,
+    # Share XDG_RUNTIME_DIR among all instances of this sandbox
+    shared_runtime_dir(name),
+    # Access to display servers, hardware acceleration, and audio
+    host_access({
+      "dev": {
+        ("dri", "snd"): Access.Device,
+      },
+      XDG_RUNTIME_DIR: {
+        (os.environ["WAYLAND_DISPLAY"], "pulse"): Access.Read,
+      },
+    }),
+    X11(),
+    # Access to some key user configuration.
+    # We set GSETTINGS_BACKEND to make GTK3 apps use the config file in ~/.config/glib-2.0.
+    # (The "right" solution here is probably the settings portal...)
+    home_access({
+      (".config/fontconfig", ".config/glib-2.0", ".XCompose", ".local/share/applications"): Access.Read,
+    }),
+    bwrap_flags("--setenv", "GSETTINGS_BACKEND", "keyfile"),
+    # Access to basic d-bus services (that are hopefully safe to expose...)
+    dbus_proxy_flags(
+      "--call=org.kde.StatusNotifierWatcher=@/StatusNotifierWatcher",
+      "--call=org.freedesktop.Notifications=@/org/freedesktop/Notifications",
+      "--call=org.freedesktop.ScreenSaver=@/org/freedesktop/ScreenSaver",
+      "--call=org.freedesktop.ScreenSaver=@/ScreenSaver",
+      "--talk=org.freedesktop.portal.*",
+    ),
+    # Make it possible to open websites in Firefox
+    home_access({ ".mozilla/firefox/profiles.ini": Access.Read }),
+    dbus_proxy_flags("--call=org.mozilla.firefox.*=@/org/mozilla/firefox/Remote"),
+  )