X-Git-Url: https://git.ralfj.de/bubblebox.git/blobdiff_plain/09eabd6ba292f845d8181d0546596fa004eba797..27fecd30b8dc7969e9cd10d9f09b62b5eda374c9:/profiles.py?ds=sidebyside diff --git a/profiles.py b/profiles.py index 5ac39c8..3d395c5 100644 --- a/profiles.py +++ b/profiles.py @@ -1,9 +1,20 @@ from bubblebox import * # Various default sandbox settings -DEFAULT = collect_flags( +DEFAULT = group( # namespace unsharing - bwrap_flags("--unshare-all", "--share-net", "--hostname", "bubblebox"), + # cannot unshare IPC as that breaks some wine applications + bwrap_flags("--unshare-user", "--unshare-pid", "--unshare-cgroup"), + # A different hostname is useful to be able to see when we are inside the sandbox. + # However, some applications will not like this unless the hostname also exists in `/etc/hosts`! + bwrap_flags("--unshare-uts", "--hostname", "bubblebox"), + # Make sure the sandbox cannot inject commands into the host terminal. + # TODO: This flag breaks some CLI applications, like job control in shells. + # Consider using SECCOMP instead. + # Possible code to use for that: + # There is also a good list of possible-syscalls-to-block at + # . + bwrap_flags("--new-session"), # basic directories bwrap_flags("--proc", "/proc", "--dev", "/dev", "--dir", "/tmp", "--dir", "/var", "--dir", "/run", "--symlink", "../run", "/var/run"), # an empty XDG_RUNTIME_DIR @@ -19,31 +30,45 @@ DEFAULT = collect_flags( }), ) -# https://github.com/igo95862/bubblejail is a good source of paths that need allowing. +def X11(): + display = os.environ["DISPLAY"].removeprefix(":").split('.')[0] + return host_access({ + "/tmp/.X11-unix/": { + "X"+display: Access.Read, + }, + os.environ["XAUTHORITY"]: Access.Read, + }) + +# https://github.com/igo95862/bubblejail/blob/master/src/bubblejail/services.py is a good source of paths that need allowing. # We do not give access to pipewire, that needs a portal (https://docs.pipewire.org/page_portal.html). def DESKTOP(name): - return collect_flags( + return group( DEFAULT, # Share XDG_RUNTIME_DIR among all instances of this sandbox shared_runtime_dir(name), - # Access to screen and audio + # Access to display servers, hardware acceleration, and audio host_access({ "dev": { ("dri", "snd"): Access.Device, }, - "/tmp/.X11-unix/": Access.Read, - os.environ["XAUTHORITY"]: Access.Read, XDG_RUNTIME_DIR: { - ("wayland*", "pulse"): Access.Read, + (os.environ["WAYLAND_DISPLAY"], "pulse"): Access.Read, }, }), + X11(), # Access to some key user configuration home_access({ (".config/fontconfig", ".XCompose", ".local/share/applications"): Access.Read, }), # Access to basic d-bus services (that are hopefully safe to expose...) - dbus_proxy_flags("--talk=org.kde.StatusNotifierWatcher.*", "--talk=org.freedesktop.Notifications.*", "--talk=org.freedesktop.ScreenSaver.*", "--talk=org.freedesktop.portal.*"), + dbus_proxy_flags( + "--call=org.kde.StatusNotifierWatcher=@/StatusNotifierWatcher", + "--call=org.freedesktop.Notifications=@/org/freedesktop/Notifications", + "--call=org.freedesktop.ScreenSaver=@/org/freedesktop/ScreenSaver", + "--call=org.freedesktop.ScreenSaver=@/ScreenSaver", + "--talk=org.freedesktop.portal.*", + ), # Make it possible to open websites in Firefox home_access({ ".mozilla/firefox/profiles.ini": Access.Read }), - dbus_proxy_flags("--talk=org.mozilla.firefox.*"), + dbus_proxy_flags("--call=org.mozilla.firefox.*=@/org/mozilla/firefox/Remote"), )